Size isn’t everything: restructuring policing in England and Wales by Loveday, Barry
The Home Secretary wants to cut the number of police forces
in England and Wales from today’s 43 to around 13. Since
small forces perform at least as well as big ones, and since
amalgamation would reduce accountability and take
resources from neighbourhood policing, the Government
should abandon this misguided move to introduce regional
government by the back door.
It should increase accountability by giving locally-elected
representatives the power to hire and fire their Chief
Constables and/or Commanders, and add capacity by
allowing forces jointly to set up dedicated specialist units
where they see fit. In policing as elsewhere, size isn't
everything.
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Big is rarely beautiful. Small is usually best. Of no public
service could this be more true than policing. The police
enjoy the privilege of arresting and detaining free citizens
and can do so only with the consent of the communities
in which they operate. Barry Loveday, a Home Office
official turned honest man, has been studying this trend
for over a decade.
In the 1990s the Home Office attempted to create a
policing NHS, a state police force. This pamphlet shoots
holes in the government case for such big organisations.
The progressive reorganisation of Britain's police into ever
larger units has merely fuelled public dissatisfaction. The
Thatcher government argued that labour unrest necessi-
tated a regional/national police force. Now terrorism and
“organised crime” is the excuse. There is no problem in
creating specialised national units or in force collaboration.
But the establishment, financing, control and accountability
of Britain's police must be to their local communities, not
Westminster or Whitehall. Loveday makes the case convinc-
ingly, yet again.
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The government should abandon its plan to amalgamate
English and Welsh police forces.
• There is no evidence that big forces perform better
than small ones. Though force performance varies
widely, even amongst those covering socio-economi-
cally similar areas, this does not correlate with size.
• Amalgamation would reduce police accountability and
responsiveness by distancing force HQs from the
communities they serve, and by sacrificing co-termi-
nosity with local authority boundaries.
• Basic Command Units lack the stability and powers
effectively to support local policing on their own.
• The estimated £500m-£600m cost of amalgamation
would come at the expense government’s
Neighbourhood Policing Strategy, as well as necessi-
tating rises in police precept. Even if all the costs were
borne by central government, equalization of precepts
across the new superforce regions would mean unpop-
ular tax hikes for city dwellers.
• Amalgamation would make it hard for police to
cooperate well with the Crown Prosecution Service,
courts and probation services.
Instead, the government should allow forces voluntarily
to federate where necessary, extend the remit of national
policing agencies and/or re-establish Regional Serious
Crime Squads, devolve more responsibilities to Basic
Command Units, and make them genuinely accountable
to local communities.
• Where forces lack needed capacity to cope with serious
or new types of crime, they should be allowed jointly to
establish permanent specialist units. They could also
exploit economies of scale in purchasing, IT and fleet
management.
• The Serious Organised Crime Agency should be
expanded to cover serious inter-regional organized and
serial violent crime, as well as people and drug-
trafficking and tax and revenue fraud. Alternatively,
Regional Crime Squads could be re-established, as has
successfully been done in the West Midlands.
• BCUs should be allowed to manage their own budgets
and set their own policies.
• BCUs should also be made genuinely accountable to
local communities. BCU commanders should be hired
and fired by city mayors or council leaders, and BCU
boundaries should be made so far as possible co-
terminus with local authority boundaries. This will be
easier if the ODPM goes ahead with its (as yet unoffi-
cial) plan to replace all county and district councils
with unitary authorities.
Force restructuring is not the major challenge facing
policing today. Workforce modernization is far more
important to the future of the service. By trying to
force through traumatic and counter-productive
amalgamations in the teeth of public and much
professional opinion, the government is wasting
political capital as well as hindering the fight against
crime.
Executive Summary
Over the last five months police forces and their police
authorities have been thrown into turmoil by the Home
Secretary’s announcement of a planned reduction in their
number from today’s 43 to around thirteen. Following a
highly critical report from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of
Constabulary (HMIC) entitled Closing the Gap, the
Home Secretary has in short order requested all forces
and authorities to address themselves to identifying a
regional structure within which to place themselves.
The timescale set for this exercise in self-immolation is
extraordinarily tight. Forces were initially required to
identify partners for amalgamation within three months
of Closing the Gap’s publication in September 2005, and
on February 6th 2006 five amalgamated regional forces –
West Midlands (to include Staffordshire, Warwickshire,
West Mercia and West Midlands); North East (to include
Cleveland, Durham and Northumbria); Merseyside
(Merseyside plus Cheshire); North West (Cumbria plus
Lancashire); and Wales (to include Dyfed-Powys, Gwent,
North Wales and South Wales) - were definitely desig-
nated to go ahead. More announcements covering the rest
of the country are expected soon.
The speed with which the Home Office has acted
upon HMIC’s report has been matched only by its reluc-
tance to engage in any meaningful consultation on the
report’s proposals. Police authorities were required to
present their own amalgamation ideas by mid-
December, and the only (delayed) parliamentary debate
held on the issue so far fell just before the Christmas
recess. No mention was made of the planned mergers
10 www.policyexchange.org.uk
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Police forces in England and Wales
1. Avon & Somerset 
2. Bedfordshire 
3. Cambridgeshire 
4. Cheshire 
5. City of London 
6. Cleveland 
7. Cumbria 
8. Derbyshire 
9. Devon & Cornwall 
10. Dorset 
11. Durham  
12. Dyfed Powys 
13. Essex 
14. Gloucestershire 
15   Greater Manchester 
16. Gwent 
17. Hampshire 
18. Hertfordshire 
19. Humberside 
20. Kent 
21. Lancashire 
22. Leicestershire 
23. Lincolnshire 
24. Merseyside 
25. Metropolitan Police  
26. Norfolk 
27. North Wales 
28. North Yorkshire 
29. Northamptonshire 
30. Northumbria 
31. Nottinghamshire 
32. South Wales 
33. South Yorkshire 
34. Staffordshire 
35. Suffolk 
36. Surrey 
37. Sussex 
38. Thames Valley 
39. Warwickshire 
40. West Mercia 
41. West Midlands 
42. West Yorkshire 
43. Wiltshire
during the May 2005 election campaign, nor in the
Labour Party manifesto.
Yet if the Home Secretary hoped for speedy acquies-
cence to his proposals from the police service, it is
becoming increasingly obvious that his hopes are
misplaced. Fewer than one in three police authorities
support the amalgamation options offered them, with
Cleveland, West Mercia, Cheshire, Sussex, Essex, Kent,
Hampshire and all the Welsh forces being particularly
loudly opposed. Of the five definite mergers announced
on February 6th, only one – of Lancashire and Cumbria –
has been approved by all the police authorities involved.
The Superintendents’ Association supports, but the
Association of Police Authorities (APA) opposes the
plans, preferring that authorities be allowed to choose for
themselves the configurations that best suit their area
[Police Professional January 2006].
Last but not least, the government itself appears only
recently to have made up its mind to mergers. A  joint
Home Office/Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit report of
www.policyexchange.org.uk        11
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Currently confirmed police mergers Proposed strategic forces
1. Avon & Somerset 
2. Bedfordshire 
3. Cambridgeshire 
5. City of London 
8. Derbyshire 
9. Devon & Cornwall 
10. Dorset 
13. Essex 
14. Gloucestershire 
15   Greater Manchester 
17. Hampshire 
18. Hertfordshire 
19. Humberside 
20. Kent 
22. Leicestershire 
23. Lincolnshire 
25. Metropolitan Police  
26. Norfolk 
28. North Yorkshire 
29. Northamptonshire 
31. Nottinghamshire 
33. South Yorkshire 
35. Suffolk 
36. Surrey 
37. Sussex 
38. Thames Valley 
39. Warwickshire 
42. West Yorkshire 
43. Wiltshire
1. North West
2. North East
3. Manchester & Cheshire
4. Yorkshire & Humberside
5. East Midlands
6. Wales
7. West Midlands
8. Eastern
9. South West
10. Thames Valley & Hampshire
11. City of London
12. Metropolitan
13. Kent, Surrey & Sussex
July 2004 stresses that merger proposals should take into
account “consequential risks for the rest of the criminal
justice system” (see pp 23–4 below), and that “Evidence
from other sectors suggests that merger can be a costly,
protracted exercise which does not always deliver
expected benefits and inevitably causes distraction for
management and staff. Any case for merger would need to
show that the likely benefits outweigh these risks [‘Police
Reform: a joint Home Office/Strategy Unit project;
summary report’ Home Office, July 2004].”
The urge to merge
The current structure of policing in England and Wales is
indeed far from perfect – even, to adopt HMIC’s catch-
phrase, not ‘fit for purpose’ – but for the exactly the
opposite reason to that given by the Home Office.
At least since the early 1960s, governments have been
prone to the belief that fewer, bigger police forces would
be more effective, efficient and easier to control. A Royal
Commission of 1962 led to the Police Act of 1964, which
enabled the Home Secretary of the day to cut 117 forces
outside London down to 49. The Local Government Act
of 1972 reduced that to today’s 41, plus the City of
London Police and the Met. In consequence, forces
naturally came to cover far larger geographical areas,
often crossing local authority boundaries. Today’s
amalgamated forces of Thames Valley and West Mercia,
for example, each cover three county councils areas.
The distancing from and loss of accountability to local
authorities implicit in the mergers was exacerbated by a
gradual arrogation of powers from local police authori-
ties to Chief Constables and the Home Secretary.
Although the 1964 Police Act set up a ‘tripartite system’
ostensibly giving equal powers to each of the three, in
practice it was heavily weighted against police authorities
and in favour of Chief Constables. Added to the quasi-
constitutional convention of ‘constabulary independence’,
this significantly reduced the ability of local police
authorities (and therefore of local communities) to influ-
ence policing styles and priorities within their own local-
ities. These became in effect things imposed upon them
by chief officers as ‘police professionals’ – contributing
perhaps to the social unrest and outbreaks of major
public disorder suffered by many English cities in the
early 1980s.
Police authorities were further emasculated by the
Conservative government’s abolition of the Greater
London Council and metropolitan county councils in
1985. One – perhaps unintended – consequence of the
reform was to do away with metropolitan police authori-
ties, which were replaced by ‘joint boards’ made up of
metropolitan district councilors. Later legislation –
notably the 1994 Police and Magistrates Courts Act, and
the 1996 Police Act – cut the size of police authorities
(usually from 35 members to 17), did away with direct
elections to the authorities, and transferred control over
police budgets from them to Chief Constables, who effec-
tively became the ‘chief executives’ of their forces.
The new powers granted Chief Constables by the 1996
Police Act were however outweighed by those gained by
the Home Office. Under the Act, the Home Secretary was
able to set national policing priorities, to which police
forces were required to draw up Local Policing Plans. The
HMIC also acquired the power to monitor police author-
ities as well as forces, explicitly undermining the
thirty-two year-old ‘tripartite system’. The Police Reform
Act of 2002 centralised power over policing yet further by
introducing a National Policing Plan (NPP) set by the
Home Secretary for three-year periods. NPPs to date have
instructed police forces to concentrate on ‘volume’ crime
12 www.policyexchange.org.uk
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“
Merger can be a costly,
protracted exercise which does not
always deliver expected
benefits
”
– burglary, mugging and theft from motor vehicles – and
have succeeded in significantly altering police behaviour
to this end.
To back up the NPPs an increasingly elaborate inspec-
tion system has been developed, involving a new Home
Office-based Police Standards Unit as well as the HMIC.
Forces and Basic Command Units (now the primary
management unit within every force) are assessed
monthly according to 37 performance indicators known
collectively as the Professional Policing Assessment
Framework, or PPAF. BCUs identified as under-
performing are reported to a Performance Review
Committee within the Home Office, which can then refer
them to Standards Unit or to HMIC. As a result, unsur-
prisingly, police activity is now heavily directed towards
fulfilling Home Office priorities and hitting Home Office
targets [Loveday 2005].
The Home Office’s powers will be extended even
further by the Police and Justice Bill 2006, published on
January 25th 2006, and due for its third reading soon. It
gives the Home Secretary the power to intervene directly
in poorly performing forces without waiting for a critical
report from HMIC or acting through the local police
authority (as specified by the 2002 Police Reform Act).
The new clause, according to a Home Office official, “will
act as an incentive to police forces to enhance perform-
ance, and make the powers that the Home Secretary has
in the Police Reform Act 2002 to intervene in failing
forces ‘fit for purpose’ [Martis 2006].” The Home
Secretary also gains the power to directly intervene in
‘poorly performing’ police authorities themselves –
possibly as a result of former Home Secretary David
Blunkett’s clashes with Humberside and Sussex police
authorities over the removal of their respective Chief
Constables. The new Act effectively puts the final nail into
the coffin of the local police authorities, as well as into the
1996 Act’s ‘tripartite system’ and Chief Constables’
already very theoretical operational independence
www.policyexchange.org.uk        13
Introduction
Closing the Gap followed on from an earlier HMIC report
titled Mind the (Level 2) Gap. Both looked at how well
police forces, as currently structured, deal with what is
known in the jargon as ‘Level 2’ crime – the sort of more
serious and complex crime, in other words, that usually
crosses force boundaries. The classification is drawn from
the National Intelligence Model (NIM) of policing, origi-
nally pioneered by the then Chief Constable of Kent,
David Philips, and now subscribed to by all forces. It
categorises crimes as follows:
• Level 1 Crime - Local criminality managed at BCU level
(eg anti-social behaviour, criminal damage, assault.)
• Level 2 Crime – Crime crossing force or BCU bound-
aries (eg a team of shoplifters covering two or more
cities, or a team of car thieves covering several neigh-
bouring counties. Not a category of specific offences.) 
• Level 3 Crime - Serious crime, organized at a national
or international level (eg terrorism, people and
narcotics trafficking).
A  major concern of the NIM – a concern, it should be said,
largely generated by the former Chief Constable who devel-
oped it – is that policing does not currently pay sufficient
attention to Level 2 crime, which allegedly finds itself
squeezed between the Level 1 crime that the general public
cares most about and the Level 3 crime that preoccupies the
Home Office. This thinking also lies behind the HMIC’s
two recent reports. In Closing the Gap HMIC argues that the
21st century policing environment is characterized by:
Wide-spread enterprising organised criminality,
proliferating international terrorism and domestic
extremism’, placing a ‘premium on intelligence,
expertise and smart use of capacity [HMIC
2005:1.4].
14 www.policyexchange.org.uk
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To deal with these “complex, volatile threats”, the report
goes on, police forces – currently geared towards Level 1
crime - need not only new capacity, but complete recon-
figuration. To justify this radical recommendation, it
presents the results of a national assessment of police
force fitness in relation to seven ‘protective services’,
namely counter-terrorism and counter-extremism;
serious organised crime; civil contingencies and
emergency planning; critical incident management;
major crime (homicide); public order, and strategic roads
policing.
The HMIC describes its findings as “stark”. Very few
forces are assessed fully to meet required standards, with
the figure of 4,000 officers - or 6,000 total staff - being
identified as a necessary minimum. Whereas forces this
size or larger “tended to meet the standards across the
seven protective services measured”, forces below this size
“tended to fall someway short of the standard, with in
general the smallest forces faring the least well [HMIC
2005:5.6].” Reponse to serious and organized crime
“suffered in many places simply because there was not
enough resources and specialist support to act upon the
intelligence gathered [HMIC 2005:1.12].” Though effec-
tive policing is well sustained at BCU level, the analysis
concluded, more serious cross-border crime is simultane-
ously underpoliced and “widespread, vibrant and
growing”, posing “the greatest risk to communities and
the economy [HMIC 2005:1.19].’
The answer to all the above, Closing the Gap concludes,
is wholesale reconfiguration of the police service. Though
the current system matching police forces to local govern-
ment structures has helped drive down volume crime,
“the current scope and scale now act as constraints to
improving protective services and the economics associ-
ated with them [HMIC 2005:1.40].” Reform will
encompass structure, processes and “relationship devel-
opments [HMIC 2005:1.47]”, enabling affordable
protective services to flourish without undermining
existing strengths in local policing. Reconfiguration
options offered for consideration are:
• Collaboration between existing forces
• Lead forces for specialist capabilities
• Lead regional forces
• Federations of forces
• Strategic forces
In quick order, however, the report finds all options other
than ‘strategic forces’ wanting. Collaboration or lead forces,
it argues, would only preserve the status quo; lead regional
forces would raise problems of accountability, and federa-
tions of forces would remain too decentralized. Resistance
from within the police service itself, it additionally claims,
would make the softer options unworkable: ‘Dissatisfaction
with the status quo – a pre-requisite for major self-reform –
may be insufficient amongst some incumbents to provide
the degree of leadership this option [federation] requires
[HMIC 2005 1.56].’
Strategic forces, Closing the Gap concludes, could be
achieved quickly and are the only option offering the
“critical mass to provide the necessary sustainable level of
protective services that the 21st century increasingly
demands [HMIC 2005:1.60].”
A dodgy dossier
Immediate acceptance of Closing the Gap by the govern-
ment has been matched by a sharply negative reaction
from many senior police officers, from police authorities
and, not surprisingly, from the opposition parties.
www.policyexchange.org.uk        15
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“
Immediate acceptance of
Closing the Gap by the 
government has been matched
by a sharply negative reaction
from many senior police
officers
”
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Divisions of opinion within Association of Chief Police
Officers ranks surfaced at ACPO’s January 2006 council
meeting, when for the first time in living memory
members demanded a vote on policy.
Doubts centre both on the validity of Closing the Gap‘s
analysis, and on its recommendations. The author of
Closing the Gap, former Chief Constable of Surrey Denis
O’Connor, himself admits that the link between force size
and performance is weak:
‘Being bigger is not enough to guarantee strong
protective services. The environment (situation)
also matters. For example, the presence of cities,
ports or events (ie. repeated exposure to risks and
challenges) also enhance the repertoire of protec-
tive services that forces offer the public. Able
leadership can also be influential in allowing
smaller forces to punch above their weight on these
issues [HMIC 2005:1.10].”
Environment aside “there are outliers: some smaller
forces were almost as successful as the majority of larger
forces, whilst two relatively larger forces (5000+ staff)
received surprisingly low scores [HMIC 2005:1.11].” At
the same time – despite country-wide introduction of the
NIM, “intelligence was the aspect with the lowest scores
and the greatest shortcomings, regardless of size of the
police force [HMIC 2005:1.14].”
Further doubt is cast on Closing the Gap’s ‘size
matters’ premise by a critique commissioned from
Anthony Lawrance, Professor of Statistics at the
University of Warwick, by the West Mercia Police
Authority in December 2005. As described above,
HMIC bases its amalgamation recommendation on the
crucial statistical finding that in policing Level 2 crime
bigger-equals-better. Lawrance questions the reliability
of the scoring method used for each force, the statistical
soundness of the claimed connection between size and
effectiveness, and HMIC’s misleading presentation of its
data.
Scoring - from 1 to 4 - for competence in each of the
seven ‘protective services’ appears to have been arrived at
by “subjective but informed judgement for each force”,
without any repeat assessments or independent second
opinions. Nor does any quantative data appear to have
been used. Scores are then simply aggregated, with no
weightings to take account of the relative importance of
different sorts of crime in different force areas. A force in
a peaceful rural area is therefore penalised for failing to
possess specialist anti-terrorism or organised crime units,
for example. “At the very least”, Professor Lawrance
comments, “it would have been sensible to give charts for
each of these protective service variables against force
size…I suspect that some rather interesting effects would
have been shown. The treatement of these data leaves me
deeply suspicious of the blanket conclusion drawn
[Lawrance: 2].”
Lawrance is also witheringly critical of HMIC’s
presentation of its data, which in the case of first key
graph (exactly reproduced below) is so uninformative
as to be meaningless: “an almost perfect example of
how not to present a graph – no scales on either axis, no
data plotted to justify the lines drawn. It is almost
impossible to obtain any critical understanding from it
[Lawrance: 4].”
Overall Trend for Protective Services
Force Size (Smallest from left)
Sc
or
e
Serious & Organised
Public Order
Major Crime
Roads Policing
Civil Contingencies
Critical Incidents
CT & DE
Another of HMIC’s key graphs, also reproduced here, fails
very obviously to support the supposed trend shown. As
Lawrance comments, “ ‘statistics’ have here been used for
support rather than illumination (…allusions to lamp posts
are not appropriate in the present context)…Looking at the
points sliced in a vertical direction, what strikes is the
variability of the total score for quite small intervals of force
size…I cannot believe that this will not still be so if the
forces were amalgamated…and the variability might well
be more [Lawrance: 3].” As for the ‘trend line’ purporting to
show that bigger forces do better, it “represents a very inade-
quate summary of a relationship that does not exist in terms
of a line, and which ignores variability about the line
[Lawrance: 6].
In summary, Lawrance concludes:
i) The quality of the statistical information
gathered for HMIC Report Closing the Gap is
questionable.
ii) The statistical treatment of the data collected is
largely unjustified and appears open to criti-
cism in its combinations of scores.
iii) The graphical presentation of the data is poor
and trend lines could be misleading; the use of
computer-produced statistical elaborations is
unjustified.
iv) The impression I get from the HMIC and
Home Office documents I have referenced is
that there has been minimum professional
statistical science input concerning the
planning stages, the data analysis, its presenta-
tion and in regard to conclusions drawn.
v) It cannot be presumed that there is a causative
relation between protective service effectiveness
and force size from rough trends on simple
graphs. The conclusions drawn in respect of the
4,000 minimum force size almost totally ignore
the variability of protective services performance
at each force size, and no evidence is provided
that this will be small at the 4,000 level. In short,
there will be an unknown number of good and
poor performers in re-formed larger forces
[Lawrance: 6].
To date there has been no official response to these criti-
cisms either from the Home Secretary or from other
ministers at the Home Office.
Level 2 or Level 1 Crime?
As doubtful as HMIC’s ‘bigger-equals-better’ conclusion
is its assumption that inter-regional crime is a large and
growing problem. Closing the Gap itself admits that for
many local communities these ‘complex, volatile threats’
are not a major concern:
Too much Level 2 activity now happens without
their knowledge and underneath the public radar.
Year on year the threats are growing ever more
severe, yet sadly the victims of serious and organ-
ised crime or major incidents do not form an
influential enough constituency to drive change
[HMIC 2005:4.18].
The same, it might be said, applies to police forces
themselves. Surveyed on behalf of the Superintendents’
Association in 2003, only small minorities – 17% and
14% - of BCU commanders thought their areas suffered
www.policyexchange.org.uk        17
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Size Isn’t Everything
above-average organized or gang-related crime, and the
majority were preoccupied with ordinary volume crime,
‘disorganised’ violent and domestic crime, anti-social
behaviour and alcohol-related disorder.
The Home Office’s claim that Level 2 crime is a growing
problem also sits oddly with British Crime Survey findings
(much vaunted by the Home Office) that violent crime
peaked sharply in the mid-‘90s, and has been falling since.
Small is beautiful
More research questioning the validity of Closing the Gap
has recently been carried out by staff at Thames Valley
Police. In the annual ‘baseline reports’ made on all forces by
HMIC, Thames Valley points out, small forces regularly take
the top spots on overall performance. Consistent chart-
toppers in the HMIC’s Professional Policing Assessment
Framework (PPAF) or ‘radars’ include Dyfed Powys and
Gloucestershire, with 1,900 and 2,200 staff respectively.
Though Thames Valley concluded that large forces did have
a slight advantage in tackling some Level 2 crime, that was
more than outweighed HMIC Baseline Assessment 2004’s
conclusion that “All police forces – regardless of size – were
found to be either ‘fair’ or ‘good’ in tackling Level 2 crimi-
nality, suggesting that there was not a great deal of variation
between any of the forces [Harrad 2005:24].” Detection rates
– widely accepted as the single most important measure of
police performance – showed small forces outperforming
large ones, as did measures of public confidence in the police
[Harrad 2005: 25].
Thames Valley’s research also questions the Home
Office’s optimistic view of the cost savings to be made via
amalgamations. By far the largest costs for the police
service in England and Wales are staff-numbers related
(salaries, pensions and other employee expenses
accounted for 81% of total police spending of £7.9 billion
in 2005 [Harrad 2005:25]). Savings will therefore not be
large unless the amalgamations enable either police estab-
lishments or civilian staff numbers to be cut – which are
not options aired by Closing the Gap.
“It is not currently possible”, the Thames Valley’s
analysis concluded, “to show that the size of a force affects
its cost efficiency, spending or performance to any signif-
icant degree. There is no clear evidence that police forces’
performance in crime reduction, detections or public
perception relate to their size or number of police
officers. Some small police forces perform extremely well
and some large police forces badly [Harrad 2006: 26]”
Thames Valley’s conclusions are backed up by new data
analysis from Policy Exchange. In 2003 Policy Exchange pre-
Question: ‘Thinking about the prevalence of the following
crimes in your area, in your opinion how does your BCU
compare to the national average?
Base:All respondents (223)
Volume crime 33 31 34
Serious/violent crime 34 25 39
Drug dealing 28 42 27
Race/hate crime 14 25 58
Witness intimidation 10 30 56
Organised criminal networks 17 28 52
Gang warfare and related killings 14 10 72
Alcohol-related disorder (e.g. from nightclubs/pubs) 30 52 16
Domestic violence 28 61 8
Traffic offences, including road traffic accidents 15 64 18
Anti-social behaviour 29 59 10
Source: Survey of Basic Command Unit Commander Performance, carried out on behalf of the
Superintendents’ Association and the Home Office by BMRB International, 2003.
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“
In each group there were
wide variations in performance,
but small forces were at least 
as likely to perform well as large
ones
”
empted the Home Office’s first-cut PPAFs or ‘performance
radars’ by publishing its own performance league tables of
English and Welsh police forces, using data from the HMIC,
Home Office and British Crime Survey. Covering the years
2001-02, they showed the overall top performers as Dyfed
Powys, Gwent, Suffolk and Hampshire – all traditional
county forces - and no correlation at all between force size
and performance within groups of forces covering socio-
economically comparable areas [Loveday and Reid 2003].
Repeating the exercise in a simplified form for the years
2004-5, Policy Exchange again found no connection
between size and success: in each group there were wide
variations in performance, but small forces were at least
as likely to perform well as large ones. (A full description
of Policy Exchange’s methodology and results can be
found in the appendix on p35.) 
The graph below, for example, compares forces
covering relatively wealthy, suburbanized areas. The two
worst performers in the group are also the smallest and
largest - Thames Valley with 7,300 sworn and civilian
staff, and Bedforshire, with only 2,200. Surrey, with well
under the Home Office’s watershed 4,000 officers, does
better than Hampshire and Kent, which are both half as
big again.
In relatively poor rural areas, the best-performing forces are
amongst the smallest in the country – Dyfed Powys, with
under 2,000 staff, and Cumbria, with 2,100. Devon and
Cornwall – a medium-sized amalgamated force dating from
the 1970s - performs second-worst in the group.
In relatively poor high population-density areas no
connection can be discerned at all between size and
performance. Cleveland, South Yorkshire and West
Yorkshire all do similarly, for example, despite the fact
that Cleveland has only 2,600 officers and civilian staff,
South Yorks 5,400 and West Yorks a sizeable 9,500.
The worst-performing force in the entire country, it should
be mentioned, is also the largest -  London’s Metropolitan
Police.With over 48,000 staff in total, it is about the same size
as the BBC and larger than the Royal Navy. The Met argues
that its various special functions – royal and diplomatic
protection, security for government buildings – invalidate
comparisons. But on the key measure of sanctioned detec-
tion rates (ie, percentage of reported crimes brought to
justice), it does significantly worse than the three other forces
covering large conurbations. While the Met achieved a
sanctioned detection rate of only 15% in 2004-5, Greater
Manchester, Merseyside and the West Midlands all achieved
19-22%, despite being less than a third of the Met’s size.
What gap?
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Closing the Gap says little about how much the restruc-
turing it recommends is likely to cost. In what might be
termed a highly elastic evaluation HMIC is only prepared
to suggest that “direct savings from merger might
[author’s emphasis] amount to £70m annually”, and that
“productivity gains worth around £250m annually might
be generated through workforce modernisation and other
[unspecified] improvements [HMIC 2005:1.31].”
Though cost savings are not put forward as a justification
for the amalgamations, it is forecast that the sale of buildings
would allow more money to be put into protective services,
while there would also be “inevitable costs associated with
change – eg IT harmonization.” On overall costs, HMIC
concludes with the admission that “unfortunately informa-
tion on this is far from perfect [HMIC 2005:1.24].”
Though HMIC may be shy about costing its amalga-
mation plan, others are less so. Police authorities have
provided interim assessments for their force areas –
which presumably they would have been happy to share
with the Home Office if asked to do so – and the head of
ACPO’s Finance Committee, Chief Constable Tim Brain
of Gloucestershire, has calculated costs at somewhere
between £500m and £627m. In the course of the House of
Commons debate on police reform of December 19th
2005, the then Liberal Democrat Home Affairs
spokesman, Mark Oaten MP, remarked that:
Different figures are being put around. My office has
spoken to a number of police authorities. First, there is
Lincolnshire. The proposed merger for the East
Midlands would amalgamate Lincolnshire, North-
amptonshire, Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire and
Derbyshire. It is estimated that that would cost £100m.
The director of finance  says that even if the
change…could result in some efficiency changes over a
long period…there could be a net recurring debt cost
of £30m a year [HC Deb 19 Dec 2005 Col 1615]….
…There is a proposal to merge Norfolk, Suffolk,
Essex, Hertfordshire, Bedfordshire and Cam-
bridgeshire into one force. The director of finance said
that that would be at a cost of £66m. Similarly, when
we talked to…Kent, Surrey and Sussex, we were told
that the merger would cost £91m. Given the global
figure we can assume a total sum of £500m to £600m.
The money will have to be found from council tax
payers or from front-line police. If the figure is £500m,
it equates to about 5,000 police officers’ [HC Deb 19th
Dec 200: Col 1616].
The Association of Police Authorities has similarly estimated
the cost of restructuring at somewhere between £430m and
£520m, including all start-up costs, IT and police precept
equalization within the new ‘superforce’ regions.
The precept equalization trap
Even if restructuring did not cost – as the current
consensus suggests – as much as £500m-600m, it would
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involve substantial rises in council tax for many local
taxpayers. Currently there are wide variations in the size
of the police precept paid by taxpayers in different force
areas, from the £70.03 payable in 2005-’06 by Band D
taxpayers in Northumbria, to the £176.00 payable in
North Yorkshire, and £196.28 in London.
Today’s situation dates back to the early 1990s, when
the Home Office introduced a new Police Funding
Formula linking central policing grants to measurable
data such as crime figures and numbers of calls for police
help. As recently explained by Tony Butler, former Chief
Constable of Gloucestershire, this emphasis on quantative
indicators rewarded measurable crime-fighting activity at
the expense of patrol and other community and preven-
tative activities. This led to a steadily widening gap in
funding between urban and rural police forces. In 1997-8
council taxpayers contributed 17% of the total budget for
non-metropolitan forces, and 12% of the budget for
metropolitan ones. By 2004-5 the gap had grown consid-
erably, with council taxpayers in non-metropolitan areas
contributing 29% of total police budgets, compared with
only 15% in metropolitan areas [Butler 2006: 28]. In West
Mercia and Gloucestershire, the proportion of the total
policing budget covered by local taxpayers rose from 19%
and 17% respectively in 1997-8, to a startling 35% and
36% in 2004-5.
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If police precepts were to be harmonized across the
new ‘superforce’ areas, this would obviously mean a
considerable rise in payments for city council taxpayers,
until now advantaged by the Police Funding Formula.
Even though rural taxpayers’ precept payments would
simultaneously come down, the poll tax experience
suggests that this would be politically extremely unpop-
ular, especially amongst the expanding portion of council
taxpayers who are retired people on fixed incomes.
The problem was forcefully highlighted by Crispin
Blunt, Conservative MP for Reigate, during December’s
policing debate:
A graphic demonstration of what has happened to
Surrey relates to financial matters. County council-
lors have been forced to find 46% of Surrey’s
funding for the next financial year from the council
taxpayer, in comparison with only 15% in 1997. If
the Government takes away from the county the
control, accountability and responsibility for the
Surrey police force, at what price will councillors
vote increasing council tax precepts to support
their force? In fact it will no longer be their police
force. They should dump the financial mess - that
is my recommendation - in the lap of the
Government, because the police will be a govern-
mental organisation accountable to no one. I would
oppose Surrey councillors who supported an
increase in police precepts in that context. They
should fight it as hard as they possibly can when it
is no longer their police force [HC Deb 19th Dec
2005 Col 1638].
Short of ‘dumping the mess in the lap of the Government’,
it is unclear how neighbouring local authorities would
divide the total precept demanded by their new, shared
police force amongst themselves. In the words of Mark
Francois, Conservative MP for Rayleigh, “The standard
Essex precept is £105 for policing compared with £145 in
Norfolk. With the greatest respect to my colleagues from
elsewhere in East Anglia, Essex council taxpayers pay
enough council tax as it is. They do not want to pay even
more to subsidise policing in other parts of East Anglia
[HC Deb 19th Dec 2005 Col 1667].”
For this reason amongst others Butler argues for a new
funding formula that does not discriminate against non-
metropolitan forces. Given the uncertainty about how
much the Home Office is prepared to contribute towards
the costs of restructuring and of ironing out the massive
differences in precept, he concludes that “individual
police forces and police authorities should be
commended for resisting the demand for individual
authorities to write their own suicide notes when the
benefits from such a step are far from clear.” If the Home
Office “insists that restructuring is the only solution”, he
goes on, “the consequences for the British public have the
potential to make the privatisation of the railways look
well planned and executed in comparison [Butler
2006:29].”
There goes the neighbourhood
The projected cost of force amalgamation needs also to be
seen within a wider policing context. The expected £500-
£600 million extra expenditure will occur at the same
time as the ‘rolling out’ of the Neighbourhood Policing
Strategy, to which the Home Office is also committed.
Currently the long-term costs of Neighbourhood
Policing, though likely to be considerable, are difficult to
estimate. Although since April 2005 the Home Office has
provided funding to recruit some 24,000 new Police
Community Support Officers (CSOs), this funding runs
out in April 2008, after which forces will be required to
pay for them themselves.
Whether forces will be able either to pay for, or to
manage, restructuring and the introduction of
Neighbourhood Policing simultaneously is doubtful. In
London, Neighbourhood Policing will be ward-based,
with constables and CSOs being permanently assigned to
Who pays?
particular locations. Already, this level of commitment is
coming at a cost, with some senior officers informally
reporting that they have had to cut back on reactive
capacity – ie response times to specific requests for assis-
tance. The Neighbourhood Policing Strategy also requires
the creation of parish or ward-level community consulta-
tion mechanism, putting additional demands on police
time. Where Chief Constables are to find the extra officers
simultaneously to man new units focusing on organized
crime is nowhere explained – likely, judging by past
experience, by cannibalizing Neighbourhood Policing. All
this may go some way to explaining the “many sleepless
nights” Denis O’ Connor experienced while preparing
Closing the Gap [Pertile 2005]. There is every reason to
fear that senior HMIC officials will experience even more
broken nights if the report’s proposals ever come to
fruition.
The right to remain silent
Aside from cost estimates, Closing the Gap has some
significant omissions. Most obviously, the alternatives to
amalgamation – force collaboration and federation – are
only cursorily explored. A substantial section assessing
the collaboration option, though written up in full, was
controversially left out of the final report.
Second, it is nowhere made clear that the report is
premised on the ‘workforce modernisation’ programme
currently being piloted in Bexley and Surrey. This
involves the replacement of sworn police officers with
civilian staff, both as CSOs and in other capacities. If, as
HMIC states, each of the seven ‘protective services’ is to
have its own permanent, dedicated staff, with no ‘double-
hatting’ within each force, this implies a significant
increase in policing manpower, only achievable if civil-
ianisation goes ahead on a large scale. Otherwise, both
ordinary volume crime policing and the Neighbourhood
Policing Strategy are liable to be undermined, with
manpower demands proving beyond the capacity of even
the most optimistic senior police manager.
Adding to the pressure on day-to-day policing will be
the fact that career advancement is likely to be much
more achievable within the new specialist Level 2 units.
To be cynical, it is already apparent that senior officers’
personal attitudes towards the government’s amalgama-
tion plan are influenced by the career opportunities that
the new superforces would provide [Martis 2005].
If the Neighbourhood Policing Strategy were to be
undermined by force amalgamations, this would be far
from the first time the Home Office has abandoned a
policing policy apparently set in stone. Recent history is
littered with abandoned policing strategies – Unit Beat
Policing; Policing by Objectives; Total Geographic
Policing; Problem Orientated Policing; Community
Policing - each of which was hailed in its time as a
solution to contemporary challenges, only to be written
off within a few years. Though it is hard to forecast any
individual policy’s shelf-life, experience suggests that
most sooner or later succumb to ‘implementation
malaise’ and political demands for new initiatives or
programmes [Loveday 2005: 346].
Third, no mention is made of the implications of
amalgamation for other parts of the criminal justice
system. Ironically it was one of the first tasks of the
incoming Labour government to reverse Director of
Public Prosecutions Barbara Mills’s disastrous reorgani-
zation of the Crown Prosecution Service only five years
earlier. As was argued at the time “One CPS area stretched
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If the Neighbourhood Policing
Strategy were to be undermined
by force amalgamations, this
would be far from the first time
the Home Office has abandoned
a policing policy apparently set in
stone
”
24 www.policyexchange.org.uk
Size Isn’t Everything
from Chester to Windsor and covered five police forces.
Crown Prosecutors were unable to forge links with senior
police officers [Loveday 1999].” Following the highly
critical Glidewell Report of 1998, 13 large, unwieldy CPS
regional offices were replaced by 42 smaller CPS offices
aligned with police forces and probation services. The
whole debacle only emphasized that regional structures
are too remote from local communities and public
agencies ever to deliver good service or to generate public
confidence.
Similarly, Her Majesty’s Court Service has over the last
three years been engaged in the difficult process of
unifying magistrates and crown and county courts into a
single service. The reform was expressly designed to bring
courts in line with the 42 police forces – and will be
rendered pointless if force amalgamations go ahead. As
one local JP wrote despairingly to The Times, “Charles
Clarke seems intent on moving the goal posts again. Are
we ever going to see a successful joined-up approach to
local justice?”
Neighbourhood policing will not survive for long unless
it takes place within a stable, secure institutional structure
that allows effective local engagement. HMIC argues that
this structure is now in place in the form of well estab-
lished Basic Command Units (BCUs), described as:
the critical building blocks of both the current
structure and a possible new arrangement. They
deliver the vast bulk of everyday policing services
and many are now sufficiently large and have
secured co-terminosity [with local authorities]
such that they can be left largely intact during a
move to a more streamlined structure.”
“Public resistance to combining smaller forces”, HMIC
goes on, “can be abated to some degree by emphasizing
that local arrangements – ie at BCU and neighbourhood
level – will not change [HMIC 2005:1.32].”
But as with other aspects of HMIC’s ‘dodgy dossier’,
this claim quickly evaporates on closer inspection.
Contrary to HMIC’s assertions, much confusion still
surrounds the size, status and role of the BCU. Outside
unitary authorities and metropolitan disctricts BCUs
have to date failed to achieve anything like the degree of
stability claimed for them. On the contrary, the recent
history of BCUs in the provinces has been one of constant
change and disruption as their boundaries have been
regularly and significantly altered by senior police
management.
The extent of the problem was highlighted by the
Home Secretary himself at the summer 2005 ACPO
conference in Birmingham, where he specifically
requested that BCU boundaries be drawn up so as to be
co-terminous with those of local authorities. The
request was followed up by a letter to the president of
ACPO asking him to ensure that all forces identify co-
terminosity as a clear objective – particularly the dozen
or so forces that have so far failed completely to do so
at BCU level.
As well as ever-changing boundaries, BCUs suffer
from professional uncertainty as to their precise role
and function. This is currently reflected in the absence
of consensus as to their most effective size. Former
Chief Constable for Bedfordshire Michael O’Byrne
notes that:
“The primary operational unit is the BCU. This
unit is made responsible for 90-95% of policing
in the area and is usually under the command of
a superintendent or chief superintendent. When
the Audit Commission initially proposed the
concept the ideal number was reckoned to be
between 150 and 200 police officers. By the late
1990s the ideal number had become for most
forces between 250 and 350 officers. Some forces
now have BCUs of over 400 officers and at least
one force has BCUs of 1000 [O’Byrne
2001:125].”
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Since those words were written in five years ago, the
number of very large BCUs has risen. Five BCUs –
Bristol Central, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Nottingham,
Lambeth and Westminster – now each have 1,000 or
more officers plus several hundred civilian staff. These
could be more accurately described as ‘city police
forces’, and the ability of a single chief officer to
manage a unit of this size is clearly questionable
[O’Byrne: 2001:125]. Though originally introduced so
as to flatten police hierarchies and give local
commanders the powers effectively to manage local
policing, their increasing size is undermining this
initial raison d’être.
The seemingly inexorable expansion of BCUs
obviously parallels current thinking on overall police
force sizes. In both cases arguments are made for ever-
larger units of policing. Yet other than some preliminary
assessments made by the Superintendents’ Association,
very little analysis has been done on what in reality
constitutes the optimum size for a BCU. In the absence of
such independent evaluation, BCU sizes in practice are
determined by ‘professional judgement’ – in other words,
by guesswork.
Despite the evident problems surrounding the
management of BCUs, professional opinion continues to
support their enlargement. This trend may well be exacer-
bated – as the APA has already suggested - by force
amalgamations, with BCUs growing ever more distant
and ‘strategic’ as force HQs do the same.
The accountability gap
A third problem with BCUs as currently constituted is
their lack of genuine accountability. It is now widely
accepted that this is requires co-terminosity between
policing and local authority borders – as well, of course,
as real powers for locally elected politicians to decide
policing policy, finance and staffing (see Loveday and
Reid’s Going Local, 2003). Indeed, the Superintendents’
Association, whose membership includes all BCU
commanders, recently stated that co-terminosity is the
single most important factor in determining whether a
BCU delivers effective policing [SA 2004].
The BCU accountability gap is most acute in non-
metropolitan counties where the two-tier system of local
government, split between county and district, pertains.
Here one BCU commander commonly covers several
district council areas, and is therefore theoretically
obliged, under the Crime and Disorder Reduction
Partnerships, to try and cater for several often conflicting
sets of priorities at once. These problematical BCUs also,
of course, belong to the county forces currently under
greatest threat of amalgamation. Overall, any notion that
they exhibit stability except in metropolitan areas is
wholly misleading.
That senior police themselves have doubts about the
level of responsibility BCUs should take on is evidenced
by their reluctance to give them powers over their own
management and finance – specifically, by the general
failure of force HQs to delegate budgets to the BCU level.
Responding to the 2003 survey by the Superintendents’
Association mentioned above, the majority of
commanders said they had no or only partial control over
every spending item listed except for overtime and office
equipment. Only 13% could make decisions as to pay
without reference to force HQ; 22% decisions about IT or
property; 27% decisions about vehicles; 29% decisions
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“
That senior police themselves
have doubts about the level of
responsibility BCUs should take
on is evidenced by their reluc-
tance to give them powers over
their own management and
finance
”
about training, and 42% decisions about levels of civilian
staffing [SA 2003: 49].
Even where budgets have been delegated, BCU
commanders’ ability to manage them is severely circum-
scribed by central control over manpower spending,
which forms by far the biggest item of policing expendi-
ture. The situation is reinforced by the ring-fenced Crime
Fighting Fund, set up by the then Home Secretary David
Blunkett, which can only be spent on police establish-
ment. Should force amalgamations go ahead, it will be
vital that priority-setting and budgets are fully delegated
down to BCU level, without every BCU decision having
to be ratified by a distant and overburdened force HQ.
Outside the Superintendents’ Association, however, such
a wholesale shift in power away from the senior ACPO
ranks is unlikely to meet with professional support.
Predictably, the accountability gap at BCU level has
been seized upon by the Opposition. As the Shadow
Home Secretary David Davis MP argued in the course of
December’s debate:
The Home Secretary has claimed that local policing
will remain through the Basic Command Units,
which he says are accountable, but there is not true
accountability there at all. He obviously does not
understand the difference between accountability
and consultation, which are indeed rather different.
The BCUs take their direction from above and
report to those above them. Local people have no
control over them whatever. What happens if the
BCU [commanders] do something wrong? Can
they be fired? No. Can they be replaced? No. Can
they be held to account in any way by the people
they serve? No. The Home Secretary says that he
desires the establishment of mechanisms that will
effectively hold BCU commanders to account, but
then he admits that those mechanisms will be non-
statutory. It is not enough for him to ‘desire’
accountability; there must be a formal mechanism
to put local accountability in place [HC Deb Col
1602 19th Dec 2005].
The lack of accountability at BCU level does indeed
constitute one of the weakest links within the restruc-
turing programme - and HMIC’s 2005 report. It may
ultimately prove to be the programme’s most contested
issue. Within the profession, the most radical thinking on
the issue has come from the Superintendents’
Association, which has recommended that local authori-
ties be involved in the selection of BCU commanders,
currently carried out by senior chief officers at force HQ.
It also suggests that a civilian manager of police services
be located and work within each local authority’s
management structure. The only caveat it makes is that
other local heads of services, and chief executives, be
made equally publicly accountable for their actions [SA
2004].
It is clear, however, that the Superintendents’
Association’s predisposition towards greater local
accountability is not entirely shared by members at ACPO
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level. For those responsible for planning the current
amalgamation programme, it is evident that the current
relationship between police HQs and BCUs is expected to
continue as is, albeit within much bigger ‘strategic’ forces.
Regional government by the back door
The accountability gap is even more glaring in relation to
the proposed new ‘superforces’ themselves. As currently
envisioned, these more or less coincide with the nine new
regional Government Office boundaries, suggesting that
the key driver behind the amalgamation plan is as much
back-door implementation of the government’s (unpop-
ular) regional government scheme as improving policing.
This suspicion is reinforced by the Home Secretary’s
sidelining of ‘crime markets’ – in other words, geograph-
ical crime patterns – as a criterion to be taken in
consideration when assessing force mergers. Though
forces and authorities were originally told that they could
be taken into account in their submissions, subsequent
merger proposals that follow them rather than regional
government boundaries have been ruled out. For
example, merger between North Wales, Merseyside and
Cheshire police was immediately rejected as crossing the
Welsh-English border, despite the fact that much Welsh
crime originates in Liverpool. Similarly, merger between
Dorset and Hampshire – logical because it would give
unified coverage of Bournemouth and Poole - was turned
down on the grounds that Hampshire falls within the
South East Government Region and Dorset in the South
West.
Some of the most vocal opposition comes from the
North East, where Cleveland has put up sustained opposi-
tion to forced merger with Northumbria and Durham. As
the chairman of the Cleveland police authority (which
has taken legal advice on the Home Office’s decision to
rule out other restructuring options), puts it:
There is a particular irony that in the northeast of
England – the one area where people had a chance to
vote on the ‘regional agenda’ and rejected it
overwhelmingly – we find ourselves being offered
just one ‘option’ by the Home Office Review Team: a
regional force. Whatever the motivation, the
[restructuring exercise] is a blueprint which more
and more people are recognizing as a serious threat
to the fundamental principles of local accountability,
consent and support [Police Review 2006:16].
One consequence of amalgamation will be much more
remote ‘regional police authorities’. Since the Home
Secretary has signaled that they will have no more than 23
elected and independent members, many local districts
will effectively be disenfranchised. The regional police
authorities will also be precepting bodies, which means
that decisions on the overall level of council taxes will also
be taken without participation at the local level.
None of these accountability and governance problems
has yet been adequately addressed either by senior police or
by the Home Office. Police planning documentation, for
example, has focused on the operational aspects of restruc-
turing. In the West Midlands strategic force area, for
example, planners have already concluded that “within a
[regional] framework there exist positive opportunities to
establish satisfactory governance arrangements.” These
would involve chief officers providing coordination and
focus within ‘sub-regions’, allowing the amalgamated
forces to meet “simultaneously the twin requirements for
operational scale and local diversity.”
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“
The key driver behind the
amalgamation plan is as much
back-door implementation of
regional government as
improving planning
”
The West Midlands planners do identify governance
and accountability as potential difficulties within a
‘Consolidated Risk Register.’ If police authority member-
ship numbers are cut following regionalisation, they ask,
“will public representation and accountability be
damaged?” But at the same time they also worry (‘Risk 5’)
that in the absence of an effective police authority  “local
civic leaders…will generate a perception that they ‘own’
BCU commanders, and attempt to unduly influence them
[Draft Police Force Restructure, West Midlands 2005].”
This sort of ambivalence does not exactly augur well
for accountability, either for strategic forces or for their
component BCUs. Options currently under active
consideration appear to include stronger partnership
working arrangements at local authority level (identified
by the Home Office within its Neighbourhood Policing
Strategy [Home Office 2006 Review of Partnership
Provisions:21].) These could be extended as part of
proposals by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for
closer scrutiny of Crime and Disorder Reduction
Partnerships by local authority Overview and Scrutiny
Committees [ODPM Joining Up Neighbourhood
Management and Neighbourhood Policing Centrex:
2006].
Neither of these proposals, though welcome, is robust
enough to provide effective oversight of BCUs at local
authority level. Yet as the distance between local BCUs
and regional force HQs grows, the need for such local
accountability becomes all the greater. ‘Community calls
for action’ as a means of influencing police – as floated by
the Home Office Review of CDRPs - are as yet untried
and untested. In any case they cannot be expected to act
as a substitute for governance mechanisms based on
democratic principles and procedures and located within
an established local government framework [Local
Government Association 2003]. The problem may
become more obvious as the ODPM assumes some
responsibilities for neighbourhood policing under its
own strategy of joining-up neighbourhood management
[ODPM: Centrex: 2006].
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Although HMIC was requested to explore alternatives to
strategic forces, Closing the Gap makes it obvious that there
was a clear presumption against the options of collaboration
or federation. There is anecdotal evidence that a section on
collaboration written for Closing the Gap, though
completed, was expressly left out of the final draft, and the
report’s general tenor strongly suggests that its conclusions
were preordained. This has of course been fully reflected in
the absence of public or other consultation following the
report’s publication in September 2005, and in the Home
Secretary’s overt stance in favour of amalgamations.
This has not deterred the Association of Police
Authorities (APA), or individual authorities and forces,
from investigating alternatives. Cleveland, West Mercia,
Essex and Kent  have all identified  the ‘stand alone’
option as being the one best suited to their circumstances.
The APA’s proposal for federations of police forces, devel-
oped with help from Sussex Police, offers a framework
that would likely prove far more popular than amalgama-
tion, and far less destabilising and expensive to
implement [Police Review 2006:8].
Under the APA’s scheme, neighbouring forces would be
able, if they wanted, to  jointly provide protective services
across a federated area, but would continue as now to
deliver local policing individually. In a logical extension
of existing arrangements for terrorism and other major
incident cover, binding legal agreements between forces
would set out the funding for and quality of protective
services, while most police functions remained the
responsibility of existing police authorities and Chief
Constables. Amongst the plan’s many advantages are that
it could be put into place relatively quickly at a moderate
cost. It would allow local forces to retain their identities
while generating enhanced capacity and some economies
of scale, for example in purchasing, IT and fleet manage-
ment. It would also – as the APA points out – be more
popular within and thus ‘owned by’ rather than imposed
on the police service, greatly enhancing its chances of
success. Finally, it would have much smaller implications
than amalgamation for levels of council tax [Police Review
2006: 8].
Elsewhere chief officers – notably Roger Baker, Chief
Constable of Essex - have proposed the retention of the 43
force system with the addition of one ‘national force’ to
fill the Level 2 gaps identified by HMIC. While providing
a strategic capability this option would avoid the turmoil
of major restructuring that the Home Secretary’s plans
will inevitably generate. Tony Butler, former Chief
Constable of Gloucestershire, agrees, arguing that that
dealing with Level 2 crime does not require wholesale
merger of police forces, as already demonstrated in the
West Midlands Region where the Regional Crime Squad
has been re-instated and other new regional collaborative
structures successfully manage asset confiscation and
counter terrorism. He adds that:
The establishment of similar structures in other
police regions would be more cost effective than
4. Proceeding in 
the right direction
amalgamating all the constituent police forces. A
further advantage would be to make these struc-
tures and their cost more transparent and not hide
them within an amalgamation programme that
would have to draw officers from other duties in
the absence of specific funding [Butler 2006:29].
Though the current president of ACPO, Sir Chris Fox,
claims near-unanimous support for the Home Secretary
amongst his members, in reality senior ranks are deeply
divided. Privately, chief officers complain that Fox has
ceased to represent their views, and the next ACPO head,
Ken Jones of Sussex, who takes over on April 1st  ’06,
eloquently supports force federation rather than amalga-
mation. (“I would strongly argue”, he recently wrote in
Police Review, “that we ought to retain most forces, and
their identities, as they are [Police Review July 1st 2005:
24-25].”)
The unitary ideal
The government is right in saying that the status quo is
not an option, but for reasons of lack of genuine account-
ability rather than because of any major shortfall in
coverage of regional organized crime. The challenge then
becomes one of identifying a police structure that
enhances accountability and local policing while also
enabling the police to provide effective ‘protective
services’ at strategic level.
On this basis alone the current restructuring proposals
are unacceptable. They would further remove policing
from the community, creating even more remote police
bureaucracies at regional level while simultaneously
eroding local accountability. As the David Heath, Liberal
Democrat MP for Somerset and Frome, put it in
December’s policing debate:
Under the Government proposals the South West
would stretch from the Isles of Scilly to north
Gloucestershire. For an individual in my
constituency there is precious little difference
between such an authority - which covers an area
the size of Belgium - and a national police force
[HC Deb 19th Dec 2005 Col 1618].
Any successful restructuring of the police service needs to
take into account forthcoming reforms to local govern-
ment. At the moment – according to a series of leaks from
ODPM in early 2006 – major changes are under consid-
eration, namely the replacement of the 34 shire counties
and 230 districts with single-tier unitary authorities. “It
would mark”, as the Daily Telegraph reported, “the biggest
shake-up of local government in England since 1974
[Philip Johnston, Daily Telegraph Jan 28th 2006].” This is
in direct contradiction to HMIC, which in Closing the
Gap specifically claimed that no plans for local govern-
ment restructuring were on the horizon.
Policing works best when subject to clear lines of
accountability, and that accountability works best when
one specific unit of local government has responsibility
for one specific unit of policing. In the words of O’Byrne:
In my experience policing works best where there
is a clear link between the BCU and the local
political unit .The shape of local government is
critical to the successful reorganisation of the
police service…Unless there is to be a massive
democratic deficit it is essential that the police
Proceeding in the right direction
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service is so structured that it has a clear
relationship with local government [O’Byrne
2001:136].
The ODPM’s proposed expansion of unitary authorities –
if it happens - would provide an extremely good platform
for exactly this kind of relationship between local govern-
ment and BCUs (as well as other criminal justice
services.) Evidence from existing unitary authorities
suggests that they are much better able to deliver
successful Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships
than their county and district counterparts.
Accountability could be enhanced – as O’Byrne suggests -
by giving local politicians the power to select BCU
commanders, as well as more control over local taxation
and spending. Together with a devolution of powers away
from Chief Constables to BCU commanders, the scheme
would provide a strong platform for neighbourhood
policing, and avoid the trauma and expense associated
with force mergers.
In the meantime 
The ODPM’s reorganisation of local government, may,
however, never happen, and in the meantime the police
may indeed (though the HMIC has not proven it) need to
cope with more Level 2 crime. As the APA argues, this is
best achieved through a federated system allowing forces
to draw on resources from surrounding areas. Regional
Crime Squads should be re-established – as recom-
mended by Butler and successfully  practised in the West
Midlands – as should other formal, collaborative struc-
tures where necessary [Butler 2006:29].
To this arrangement should be added provision for
national response to major incidents and to serious
organised and serial crime. This could take a number of
forms, but would in the first instance certainly extend to
widening the general remit given to the new Serious and
Organised Crime Agency. As Mark Oaten argued in
December’s policing debate:
Only 18 months ago they established SOCA  - the
Serious and Organised Crime Agency - because
they rightly accepted that solving some serious
crimes required expertise and a national
approach. We should expand SOCA so that
forces that…cannot cope with, for example, a
serious threat of terrorist attack or a complex
crime, can call in resources from SOCA, which
has the expertise to deal with such problems.
That is a much better model than merging forces
and requiring them to achieve SOCA’s skill level.
The solution is staring the Government in the
face. They created SOCA, which we should
expand and use further [HC Deb 19th Dec 2005
Col 1617].
Formed out of the old National Crime Squad, National
Crimininal Intelligence Service and the investigative
branches of Revenue and Customs and the Immigration
Service, SOCA is due to become operational in April ’06.
Currently its remit is to detect and reduce serious organ-
ised crime, especially drugs and people-trafficking, and
tax and customs fraud. This should be expanded
downwards to cover inter-regional organised crime (the
recent Securitas raids being perfect examples), serial
serious assaults, rapes and murders, and major incidents.
There might also be grounds for assessing the potential
utility of a ‘National Border Force’ to take over people and
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drugs-trafficking and other international organised
crime.
Conclusion
There is a growing consensus that instead of merging
police forces, to tackle serious cross-border organised
crime new National Policing Agencies should be created,
or greater use made of existing ones such as SOCA. Such
agencies would be directly accountable to the Home
Secretary, and their responsibilities would encompass
counter-terrorism, serious organised crime and drug
trafficking, national border policing and some protective
services.
This would eliminate the need for more specialist
capability across all regions, but would allow, if necessary,
for the re-establishment of the six Regional Crime Squads,
which until their replacement by the National Crime Squad
in 1998 provided an effective service at this level.
A wider national dimension would also allow for
consolidation of local policing within unitary authorities,
if these do indeed wholly replace country and district
councils. Establishing BCU commands with boundaries
coterminous with those of unitary authorities would
provide the most stable, responsive and effective platform
for local policing – which the sort of policing the public
cares most about.
Preserving existing forces would also have the advan-
tages of saving money, minimising disruption, avoiding
unpopular rises in police precept, and preserving
(painfully acquired) co-terminosity with the Crown
Prosecution and Courts Services.
Most importantly, it would allow a reform much more
fundamental that force restructuring to the future success
of policing, namely workforce modernisation. As the
Chief Constable of Surrey, Bob Quick, recently said in an
aside to an APA conference, restructuring is ‘moving the
deckchairs’, the real issue being improving productivity,
especially by the more widespread and flexible use of
police staff.
Such a modernisation programme, if implemented,
would both professionalise policing and effectively
expand the police establishment by freeing up sworn
officers from jobs that could be equally well filled by civil-
ians. Politically it might be a hard sell, as evidenced by the
fact that all three parties are still striving to outbid each
other on headline figures for officer numbers. Indeed, this
view of policing as a sort of virility test for governments
has undermined many attempted reforms over the years.
In summary, our recommendations are as follows:
• The government should seek to establish a three-tier
policing system based on:
- Local BCUs responsible for neighbourhood
policing and community safety.
- Federated forces responsible for most protective
and specialist services.
- National agencies responsible for serious inter-
regional and international organised crime, people
and drug-trafficking and counter-extremism and
counter-terrorism.
• At the local level, BCUs should be strengthened and
made more accountable. They should have charge of
their own budgets and priority-setting, and BCU
commanders should be both hired and fired by local
politicians – mayors where they exist, council leaders
or specially-elected police boards or commissioners.
• At the intermediate level, forces should be encouraged
voluntarily to federate where they lack genuinely
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needed capacity to deal with inter-regional, complex,
unusual or new sorts of crime. They should be allowed
jointly to finance and manage permanent units in
specialisms such as forensics, murder, and underwater
and helicopter search. They should exploit economies
of scale on purchasing and fleet management. Regional
Crime Squads could also be re-established.
• At the national level, SOCA  should be expanded to
cover those protective services not covered by federated
forces. Alternatively new national agencies could be
created – for example a National Protective Services
Agency to deal with serious organised crime, and a
National Border Protection Agency to deal with inter-
national trafficking and terrorism.
Not all these reforms need to happen at once: devolution
of BCU budgets, for example, could take place immedi-
ately, as could the assumption of greater powers over
BCUs by local authorities where they are co-terminous
with BCU boundaries. Serious thought also has to be
given to demarcation issues between federated forces, re-
established Regional Crime Squads and national agencies
such as SOCA. Murder, for example, though a very
serious and in most areas thankfully rare offence, usually
has no regional or national dimension.
The advantages of merged ‘superforces’ are so doubtful,
and their drawbacks so obvious, that it is hard to see why
the Home Secretary has thrown his weight behind the
scheme with such enthusiasm. The better – and incidentally
more popular – course would be to allow forces to collabo-
rate on specialist services where necessary, and to bolster
local policing by creating genuine accountability – not
simply consultation mechanisms – at the local authority
level. His resources and political capital thus freed up, he
could then turn his attention to the hard, but much more
rewarding, task of making English and Welsh police more
productive and professional.
34 www.policyexchange.org.uk
Size Isn’t Everything
www.policyexchange.org.uk        35
The aim of this analysis was to examine HMIC’s claims
that big forces in general perform better than small forces,
and that there is a watershed number of around 4,000
officers below which forces are ineffective.
Firstly, the 42 forces (excluding anomalous City of
London) were divided into five groups covering compa-
rable areas, namely: large conurbations, rich
high-population density areas, poor high-population
density areas, rich low-population density areas, and poor
high-population density areas. The four large conurba-
tion areas were London, Greater Manchester, Merseyside
and the West Midlands. Elsewhere, unemployment rates
and population per square kilometre for each force area
were calculated, and forces grouped according to whether
they fell above or below the two means. (The same
method used in Policy Exchange’s earlier report, Going
Local.)
The resulting groupings were as follows:
i) Major Conurbations: Greater Manchester;
Merseyside; the Metropolitan Police; West Midlands
ii) Smaller Cities (areas with relatively high population
density and relatively high unemployment):
Cleveland; Derbyshire; Gwent; Lancashire;
Nottinghamshire; South Wales; South Yorkshire;
West Yorkshire.
iii) Rich Suburban (relatively high population density,
relatively low unemployment): Bedfordshire;
Cheshire; Essex; Hampshire; Hertfordshire; Kent;
Leicestershire; Staffordshire; Surrey; Sussex;
Thames Valley.
iv) Poor Rural (relatively low population density,
relatively high unemployment): Cumbria; Devon
and Cornwall; Durham; Dyfed Powys;
Humberside; Norfolk; North Wales;
Northumbria.
v) Rich Rural (relatively low population density,
relatively low unemployment): Suffolk; Cam-
bridgeshire; Wiltshire; Gloucestershire; Dorset;
Warwickshire; North Yorkshire; Lincolnshire;
Northamptonshire; West Mercia; Avon and Somerset.
Performance data were taken from the Home Office’s
Police Performance Assessments for 2004-5. From the
37 PPAF perfomance indicators used by the Home
Office, we selected the 21 most useful, rejecting those
that measured absolute numbers rather than
percentage rates, or non-central policing activities.
Measures of the public’s fear of crime and perceptions
of crime levels were also omitted. The 21 chosen
performance indicators (PIs) fell into three categories
as follows:
(i) Crime Rates: Comparatives risk of personal crime;
comparative risk of household crime; domestic
burglary rate; violent crime rate; robbery rate;
vehicle crime rate; life threatening and gun crime
rate; road traffic and safety casualty rate.
Appendix:
Methodology used for force performance comparisons
(ii) Sanction Detection Rates: Offences brought to
justice rate; overall sanction detection rate; burglary
sanction detection rate; violent crime sanction
detection rate; robbery sanction detection rate;
vehicle crime sanction detection rate.
(iii) Public satisfaction with the police: satisfaction with
making contact; satisfaction with action taken;
satisfaction with progress updates; satisfaction with
treatment by staff; satisfaction with overall service;
satisfaction of victims of racism; comparative satis-
faction of minority ethnic groups.
Within each group the forces were rated for each
performance indicator. The number 1 was assigned to the
best performing force on a PI, with the second best being
assigned the number 2 and so on. As mentioned above,
only PIs that we felt were fair and useful comparators
were used. Each force’s 21 PI rankings were then
combined to give a final score. The force with the lowest
total of ranking points within each group was, therefore,
the best performing.
Force sizes were established by totalling numbers of
officers and civilian staff employed. Forces vary widely
in the extent to which they use civilian staff and
Community Support Officers, with the result that
comparing officer numbers alone would not give fair
comparisons of actual force capacities. (See Barry
Loveday’s ‘Workforce Modernisation’, forthcoming in
the Police Journal.)
For each force group, a graph was plotted comparing
overall performance ranking and size. X-axes record force
sizes (ie total numbers of sworn and non-sworn staff). Y-
axes record performance rankings, and were inverted so
as to make clear that the forces with the smallest numbers
of ranking points are the best performing.
The two graphs not included in the main text are
included below.
The relative performance of the four forces covering
major conurbations is commented on on p19 above;
within the ‘rich rural’ group the worst performer is Avon
and Somerset, also by far the largest force in this category
with nearly 6,000 staff. On the other hand the smallest
force, Warwickshire did not perform well either, coming
seventh in a group of ten, and it should be noted in Avon
and Somerset’s extenuation that it covers the city of
Bristol. The best performers in the group are Suffolk and
West Mercia, with fewer than 2,500 and over 4,000
members of staff respectively. As with the other groups,
overall no correlation whatsoever is apparent between
performance and size.
The obvious conclusion of this analysis is that the size
of a force has no direct bearing on how well it prevents
crime, detects crime or pleases the public.
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The Home Secretary wants to cut the number of police forces
in England and Wales from today’s 43 to around 13. Since
small forces perform at least as well as big ones, and since
amalgamation would reduce accountability and take
resources from neighbourhood policing, the Government
should abandon this misguided move to introduce regional
government by the back door.
It should increase accountability by giving locally-elected
representatives the power to hire and fire their Chief
Constables and/or Commanders, and add capacity by
allowing forces jointly to set up dedicated specialist units
where they see fit. In policing as elsewhere, size isn't
everything.
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